GLOBAL WOMEN
WRITERS
KEY
TERMS and
DEFINITIONS
Section I: Key Terms and Definitions in Feminist Theory
Section II: Key Terms and Definitions in Post-colonial
Theory
Addendum I: Key Terms and Definitions in Anzaldua
Addendum II. Key Terms and Definitions in Lionnet
Addendum III: Key Terms and Definitions in Sandoval
Humm,
Maggie. The Dictionary of Feminist
Theory.
Colombus: Ohio
* All terms and definitions in SECTION I A are from:
Gamble, Sarah. The Routledge Critical Dictionary
1999.
*All terms and definitions in SECTION II are
from:
Ashcroft, Bill, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin, eds. Key Concepts In Post-Colonial Studies.
New York: Routledge, 1998.
Anzaldua, Gloria. Borderlands:La
Frontera, The New Mestiza. San
Lionnet, Francoise. Autobiographical
Voices: Race, Gender, Self-
*Addendum III:
Chela Sandoval. Methodology of the Oppressed. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2000.
* Several
terms evidence the overlap of feminist and post-colonial theory.
Please
consider these “junctures” very carefully.
* If you
use any of these definitions in your papers You Must Cite the
SECTION
I: KEY
TERMS AND DEFINITIONS IN FEMINIST THEORY
·The following is an
alphabetical list of terms included in
Section I.
·Terms repeated in both
sections but defined differently are in
BOLD:
Two terms which are opposites. For example, rational/irrational,
white/black, man/woman. These binaries
in turn produce hierarchies of meaning which are then socially
institutionalized. Binaries (also known
as dichotomies) are common in Western social and political thought and reflect
the fundamental dichotomy male/female.
The first term in any binary (‘man’) is usually seen as positive and
superior to the other term (‘woman’) but to depend on the second term for its
meaning: for example, male/female, culture/nature, active/passive.
A critique of binary opposites is
central to the work of Jacques Derrida (1967, 1978). Briefly, he argues that presence or identity is constructed only
by an absence; women are women only because they are not men and presence is
therefore illusory. Derrida
deconstructs these binary opposites and problematises the view that identity
and truth need to be represented in oppositional terms. Feminists also challenge the hierarchies
implied in binary opposites.
Helene Cixous, the creative writer
and philosopher, argues that social representations depend upon gendered binaries. In opposition, Cixous creates a positive
feminine in a discourse which she calls ecriture
feminine. See Cixous (1976). Other feminist writers argue that binaries could
be reversed to privilege women’s qualities (Daly 1978 and Rich 1976, 1980).
The rational/irrational binary
structuring male-based sciences is attacked by Sandra Harding (1991). She argues that this binary needs to be
superseded by more plural, experiential and feminist knowledge.
Systems of thought dominated by
binary opposites are also often racist.
For example, Patricia Hill Collins points out:
One must either be Black or white in
such thought systems – persons of ambiguous racial
and ethnic identity constantly
battle with questions such as ‘What are you anyway?’ This
emphasis on quantification and
categorization occurs in conjunction with the belief that
either/or categories must be
ranked. The search for certainty of
this sort requires that one
side of a dichotomy be privileged
while its other is denigrated. (Collins 1990, p. 225)
The study of human and physical
life. Questions of biology are central
to feminism because women’s oppression is deeply determined by our ability to
give birth. Feminist theory has always
explicitly recognized the importance, for women, of freedom from reproductive
control although de Beauvoir, Juliet Mitchell, Firestone, Griffin, Rich, and
others describe different paths to freedom.
Feminist research is investigating
how women’s bodies function within the context of our lives and argues that our
biology develops in reciprocal and dialectical relationship with the ways in
which we live. See Lowe and Hubbard
(1983).
Some feminist theorists argue that
reconstructions of women’s ‘intrinsic’ biological nature are scientifically
meaningless and are usually politically or ideologically motivated. Sociobiology in particular is attacked by
feminist theorists because it renders the biological as more important than the
social origins of women’s roles. See
Bleier (1984). All feminists agree that
feminist theory must dispel naturalistic explanations which provide biological
justifications for women’s economic and social limitations.
A historically specific form of
patriarchy in which patriarchy operates through class and productive
relations. The subordination of women
is shaped by specific modes of production.
One instance of the collaboration between capitalism and patriarchy,
which has been a focus of discussion among feminist scholars, is the
combination of protective legislation and women’s exclusion from male dominated
trade unions. See Hartmann (1976).
A system of domination over subject countries. Feminist theorists argue that this process
is analogous to women’s experience of oppression in patriarchy.
In the absence of external colonies
women become ‘a last colony’ (Werlhof et
al. 1983).
The colonial process ‘naturalized’
colonized women as the counterpart of the ‘civilizing’ of European women. The two processes are causally linked
because of the creation of ‘savage’ and ‘civilized’ women and the polarization
between the two is an organizing structural principle of patriarchal capitalism. The colonizers used a diametrically opposed
value system vis-à-vis the women of
the subjugated peoples as that used to their ‘own’ women. See Reddock (1984).
In Sexual Politics (1970) Kate Millett was the first to point out to
the colonialisation of women in contemporary patriarchy. This colonialisation, Millett claims,
functions by a mechanism of the ‘interior colonialisation’ in women of male
values. Robin Morgan adds the dimension
of sexuality to Millett’s argument, by describing women’s bodies as the ‘land’
of male colonizers. See Morgan (1977).
Dalla Costa claims that the family
and household are a colony. Adrienne
Rich draws on Fanon’s theory that colonialisation is a metaphor never an
explanation, to argue that women’s oppression as mothers is a form of
colonialisation because men define and appropriate motherhood.
The difference between the
‘subjects’ and ‘objects’ of research.
In traditional research, a researcher is in opposition to, and above the
particular and lived experience of his ‘objects’. Liz Stanley and Sue Wise argue that rejecting the
scientist/person dichotomy will dismantle the power relationship which exists
between researchers and researched. See
Stanley and Wise (1983). The
alternative to dichotomy is a dialectic woman-centered theory.
Barbara Du Bois argues that
dichotomy is not, in any case, a property of nature but of a learned mode of
thought, a way of seeing and knowing that turns reality into rigid,
oppositional and hierarchical categories.
She says that the challenge for feminist science will be to see and
describe without recreating these dichotomies, without falling into the old
pattern of objectifying experience. See
Du Bois (1983).
A necessary polarity between women
and men and between women. Feminists
define difference politically, not simply in terms of sexual categories.
Defining difference has been the
single greatest contribution of second wave feminism to theory. Difference has two senses in feminism. A primary meaning is that women have a
different voice, a different psychology and a different experience of love,
work and the family from men.
Difference also means a negative category which includes the exclusion
and subordination of women.
Kate Millett and Shulamith Firestone
express the view that women’s differences from men are the chief mechanism of
women’s oppression. ‘Difference’ is an
artifact of patriarchy and male and female are really two different cultures.
Much of the theoretical writing of the
1970’s focused on gender difference and therefore on psychological rather than
on political, economic or social issues.
For example, Nancy Chodorow argued that gender difference stemmed from
childhood psychosocial affiliations.
Audre Lorde and more contemporary theorists attack the false
universalism in feminist analysis as a form of neo-colonialism or
neo-imperialism. They point to crucial
differences between Black and white women for example, to the enormous
differential of power. ‘Difference is that
raw and powerful connection from which our personal power is forged’ (Lorde
1984b, pp. 111-12).
French theorists locate the meaning
of difference in power relations.
Monique Wittig argues that the ideology of sexual difference functions
as a form of censorship because it masks as ‘natural’ the social opposition
between men and women.
Masculine/feminine, male/female are categories which serve to conceal
the fact that social differences always belong to an economic, political, and
ideological world. See Wittig
(1982). Colette Guillaumin adds that
difference is quite simply the statement of the effects of a power relationship.
Difference is a fact of dependence and a fact of domination. See Guillaumin (1982). Jacques Derrida uses la difference meaning both to differ (in space) and defer
(postpone) as an antidote to totalitarianism.
See Derrida (1967).
Radical feminism defines difference
as a great positive. Mary Daly claims
that to simplify differences would be to settle for a less than dreadful judgement
of the multiple horrors of gynocide.
Adrienne Rich suggests that an epistemological revolution can stem from
the different physiology of women. A
new revolution of consciousness comes from women’s unique capacity to nurture.
The relation between language and
social reality.
Sheila Rowbotham argues that
discourse is the instrument of
patriarchal domination and that struggle for power within discourses is an
issue of political importance for the women’s movement. See Rowbotham (1973b). Ros Coward argues that in order to
understand the construction of gender differences we need to look at the
contexts, transformations and definitions of sexuality in several discourses
and how these are produced. See Coward
(1978). Jean Elshtain suggests that the
nature and meaning of feminist discourse itself must be a subject for critical
enquiry. She defines feminist discourse
as a political discourse directed towards the construction of new meanings. See Elshtain (1981).
Sara Ruddick has called ‘maternal
thinking’ a feminist discourse which is imbedded with maternal values and ways
of seeing. See Ruddick (1984).
The term incorporates several
meanings. In sum, equality is based on
the idea that no individual should be less equal in opportunity or in human
rights than any other. Liberal feminism
campaigns for the granting of full equality of formal rights to women as the
solution to women’s subjection. Equality,
like equal rights, would also to liberal feminists be part of a progressive
rationalization of human society.
Harriet Taylor in The
Enfranchisement if Women (1851) pointed out that female inequality became a
custom and tradition solely through men’s superior strength. See Mill and Mill (1970).
One problem with liberal feminism is
that even with the granting of equality to women in public life, women’s
domestic labor will always be unequal to that of men. More subtly, the hidden patriarchal agendas of public
institutions can subvert the apparent equality of legal rights (see Education).
Contemporary American theorists
argue that the principle of equality cannot be initiated in a meritocracy. Sandra Harding suggests that where standards
of merit are more or less universally shared and uncontroversial the equality
of opportunity principle might function, but that it is a reactionary device at
times when social relations, structured by institutions, need deep
changes. See Harding (1978-9).
The belief that differences between
women and men are essences – that there are unique male and female natures –
rather than the view that differences are socially/experientially
constructed. If differences are
essential then they are assumed to be universal, ‘natural’ and derive from biology. Essentialism has many meanings in feminist
theory including French essentialism and strategic essentialism. Feminists continually debate issues of
essentialism but because most feminist critiques are written by and as women, the key issue is whether there
are essential or innate differences between men and women and whether these are
biological or constructed.
Constructionist beliefs (for example, de Beauvoir’s concept ‘One is not
born but rather becomes a woman’) are more common in feminist theory (de
Beauvoir1953). Indeed ‘essentialism’ is
often a derogatory label used to dismiss those feminists believing in marked
gender differences. Currently feminist
theory is clarifying the term and distinguishing between essentialism as a
universal essence, essentialism as a commonality and essentialism as a
particular historical formation (Brah 1991).
Brah calls for a non-essentialist universalism; that is, a universalism
which is historically produced.
Feminist theorists who focus on
essentialism include Luce Irigaray who suggests that there is an essential
feminine difference deriving from biological differences and that this
difference is repressed by patriarchy (Irigaray 1974a). By describing a plural feminine, Irigaray escapes the risk of biological
essentialism. Teresa de Lauretis argues
that feminists should ‘risk’
essentialism since this is what distinguishes feminist from non-feminist
thinking (de Lauretis 1991). For
example, Italian feminism draws on the notion of women’s essential and
originary difference which is maternal (Bono and Kemp 1991). Cultural and French feminists agree that the
maternal is an essential actual or potential female experience (Rich 1976;
Kristeva 1980).
Anti-essentialist feminists are
concerned that theories of essential gender difference are too biological or
too conservative. Deconstructionists
attack any fixed binaries (men/women) (Moi 1985). Following Lacan, psychoanalysts argue that sexuality is
constructed by language rather than biology and that the subject of feminism is
not ‘a woman’ since this would be essentialist (Mitchell and Rose 1982). Postmodernists challenge notions of
universality within mass culture. In
addition Black feminists challenge racist paradigms of an essential Black
identity. For example, bell hooks
attacks essentialism by drawing attention to the interaction of class and
gender with Black identities (hooks 1991).
Finally bodily essentialism is challenged by Judith Butler’s
poststructuralist concept that gender is a ‘performance’ (Butler 1990).
Debates about essentialism are
complex. Most feminists hold onto the
idea that critiques of essentialism need not betray the authority of experience.
One good example is Gayatri Spivak’s idea of ‘strategic’ essentialism or
historical moments of essentialism.
Spivak claims that if strategic essentialism is practiced by the
dispossessed themselves then essentialism can be powerfully disruptive (Spivak
1987).
In anthropology ethnicity
characterizes the culture of a distinctive, sometimes racially distinct,
group. Feminist anthropologists are
concerned about the arbitrariness of race categories and that, whatever the
system of classification, women often remain a ‘muted’ group. See Ardener (1981).
Feminists point, too, to how
sociology has pathologised and problematised ethnic communities in Britain and
America. These analyses have had an
impact on Euro-American contemporary feminist thought by linking feminist
theory to colonial experiences. Black
feminists propose we engage with the contradictions,
not with the similarities which shape our roles as women, and not be trapped by
false universalism. For example, bell
hooks describes how women’s communities are not a new feminist experience for
Black women but have a long-term history.
See hooks (1987).
Other feminists argue that we should
see ethnicity not as a cultural problem
but in the broader context of state harassment and the double oppression of
Black women. See Amos and Parmar
(1984).
A way of thinking which is unable to
see differences and which universalises all values and ideas from the subject’s
experience of her own white ethnic group.
Eurocentricity creates models which leave no room for validating the
actual struggles and experiences of Black Third World women. An example would be the image of an Asian
woman as ‘passively’ subject to oppressive family practices or to think that
the strength of Afra-Caribbean women is located only in motherhood. Audre Lorde argues that white feminism’s
failure to recognize difference as a crucial strength is a failure to reach
beyond the first patriarchal lesson.
See Lorde (1984).
Women’s private awareness and
knowledge drawn from participation in social life. The experience of women is often denied as ‘real’ or important and
our difficulty in accepting the validity of our experience is part of our
cultural heritage and perpetuated in schooling. Feminists draw attention to the gap between women’s experience of
the world and the theoretical schemes we have available in which to think about
experience. See Smith (1974).
The challenge is to convert women’s
private concerns into shared public concerns.
This occurs in consciousness-raising groups and also in the revaluation
of women’s experience as a part of social science methodology and theory. Feminism argues that personal, lived
experience is intensely political and immensely important politically. See Stanley and Wise (1983).
One hallmark of contemporary
feminist research in any field is the investigator’s continual testing of the
plausibility of the work against her
own experience. See Parlee (1979). Reversing a longstanding tradition of
relying on (or being expected to rely on) the advice of male experts gives
women an ‘authority' of experience’.
See Diamond and Edwards (1977).
Socio-historians argue that to study the history of women, especially as
it is recorded through the consciousness of women themselves, is to discover
how one’s life experiences are joined to those of other women. Marcia Westkott calls this ‘experiences of
consciousness-in-history’. See Westkott
(1983). Indeed, women researchers have
to begin with personal experience since traditional disciplines do not often utilize
women students’ personal or emotional experiences. For women an emotional reaction is, however, often the foundation
of critical thought and more astute theory.
See Rutenberg (1983).
It is precisely the rich and varied
experiences of contemporary feminism which contribute to the variety of its
theories. Anthropologists argue that
feminism theory must look for variety both in the experiences of women in other
societies and in the experiences of women of different classes, races and
nationalities in contemporary industrial society. The claim to a diversity of experience is an important part of
the Black radical critiques of Audre Lorde and Angela Davis. As Gerda Lerner pointed out: if women’s
experience is the norm, men will become the Other.
The definition incorporates both a
doctrine of equal rights for women (the organized movement to attain women’s
rights) and an ideology of social transformation aiming to create a world for
women beyond simple social equality.
Gerda Lerner argues that feminism must distinguish for itself between
women’s rights and women’s emancipation.
See Lerner (1978).
In general, feminism is the ideology
of women’s liberation since intrinsic in all its approaches is the belief that
women suffer injustice because of our sex.
Under this broad umbrella various feminisms offer differing analyses of
the causes, or agents, of female oppression.
Marxist feminists identify mainly
the sexual division of labor as a cause of oppression and Marxist feminism is
then an agenda of economic change.
Catharine MacKinnon on the other hand identifies sexuality as the
primary social sphere of male power.
She argues that feminist political theory must centre on the
construction and social determination of sexuality, since to feminism the
personal is epistemologically the political, and its epistemology is its
politics. See MacKinnon (1982).
Feminism also incorporates various
methods of analysis and theory, if feminism is taken to be the theory of the
woman’s point of view.
Consciousness-raising is the quintessential method of feminism, and
since feminism means knowledge of existing things in a new light it needs a
distinctive account of the relation of method to theory.
Feminism’s method recapitulates as
theory the reality it tries to describe.
For example, feminism challenges universalisms and uses the pursuit of
consciousness itself as a form of political theory and practice. See Hartsock (1979).
Indeed some French theorists have
abandoned the use of the word ‘feminism’ altogether on the grounds that it is
one more ism. See Makward (1980).
Definitions of feminism by feminists
tend to be shaped by their training, ideology or race. So, for example, Marxist and socialist
feminists stress the interaction within feminism of class with gender and focus
on social distinctions between men
and women. See Mitchell and Oakley
(1976). Black feminists argue much more
for an integrated analysis which can unlock the multiple systems of
oppression. See B. Smith (1981). (The different political theories of
feminism are entered as individual categories: see, for example, Anarchist
feminism or Marxist feminism.)
Like feminism, there is not, nor
could be, a single definition of feminist since feminists have many differing
affinities – of sexual preference, class and race. In short, a feminist is a woman who recognizes herself, and is
recognized by others, as a feminist.
That awareness depends on a woman having experienced
consciousness-raising, knowledge of
women’s oppression, and a recognition of women’s differences and communalities.
Some feminists argue for a
definition that is future orientated – that a feminist must have a concept of
social transformation. See Eisenstein
(1984). Others argue for a definition
that recognizes the validity of women’s contemporary experiences. See Duelli Klein (1983). ‘I myself have never been able to find out
precisely what feminism is. I only know
that people call me a feminist whenever I express sentiments that differentiate
me from a doormat or a prostitute’ (West 1982, p. 219). But all feminists share a commitment to, and
enjoyment of, a woman-centered perspective.
A culturally shaped group of
attributes and behaviors given to the female or to the male. Contemporary feminist theory is careful to
distinguish between sex and gender.
Building on the work of Margaret Mead in Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies (1935), such
theory takes the view that sex is biological and that gender behavior is a
social construction.
Kate Millett and Shulamith Firestone
radicalized contemporary thinking about gender. In The Dialectic of Sex
Firestone argues that gender distinctions structure every aspect of our lives
by constituting the unquestioned framework in terms of which society views
women and men. Gender difference, she
claims, is an elaborate system of male domination. The theoretical task of feminism is to understand that
system. The political task of feminism
is to end it.
Polarity is essential to gender
construction since each gender is constructed as the opposite of the
other. Simone de Beauvoir was first to
describe ‘woman’ as Other or ‘not man’.
This concept of Otherness underlies categories of contrasting
characteristics labeled feminine and masculine, for example ‘hysterical’ or
‘angry’ which reflect gender related expectations.
Traditional sex difference studies
are designed to prove that these characteristics are not socially constructed
but derive from biological differences.
Feminists criticize pro-gender biological evidence as being fallacious. See Maccoby and Jacklin (1974). Feminist sociologists are able to show that
attributes that Western society considers ‘natural’ for women are usually
created by social pressures or conditioning.
The internalization of these attributes is called gendering. See Oakley (1972).
Feminist anthropologists ask us to
study the significance of gender for the organization of social life so that we
can conceptualize a future society without traditional categories. See Rosaldo (1980). Gayle Rubin argues that gender is a product
of the social relations of sexuality because kinship systems rest upon
marriage. Every gender system exhibits
an ideology or cognitive system that relies on repression in order to present
gender categories as being fixed. See
Rubin (1975).
This focus on gender as a locus of power
relations set the terms of debate for much theoretical writing of the
1970s. The great strength of
contemporary feminism lies in its dissection of the mythology surrounding
gender. Psychoanalysts argue that the
gender division of labor in the modern nuclear family, which gives exclusive
responsibilities for early childcare to the mother, produces
gender-differentiated people with desires and capacities to continue the gender
division of labor. Basing her theory on
gender differences observable in the ‘preoedipal’ period of development, Nancy
Chodorow claims that only a transformation of the social organization of gender
can lead to the disappearance of sexual inequality. See Chodorow (1978).
Dorothy Dinnerstein felt that symbiotic gender arrangements were leading
to a planetary crisis affecting human future.
Less apocalyptically, Carol Gilligan relies on Chodorow’s view of female
gender identity to argue that this identity formation makes women relational, unlike
male gender identity which stems from separatism and autonomy. See Gilligan (1982).
The analysis which Millett and
Firestone began and which was extended and deepened by Adrienne Rich and Nancy
Chodorow shifted feminist theory from a focus on sex roles to a woman-centred
perspective. As Catharine MacKinnon
argues, sexuality is the linchpin of gender inequality because gender is based
on an ideology that attributes its learned qualities to nature. See MacKinnon (1982).
This term refers to the unconscious
or explicit assumption that heterosexuality is the only ‘normal’ mode of sexual
and social relations. Feminist
theorists agree that heterosexuality, as an institution and as an ideology, is
a cornerstone of patriarchy. For
example, heterosexism implies the suppression and denial of homosexuality and
assumes that everyone is, or should be, heterosexual. Second, heterosexism relies on the fallacious superiority of the
dominant male, passive female pattern.
See Darty and Potter (1984).
Other critics point out that heterosexist
values and norms legitimize the sexual division of labor. See Ferguson et al. (1982).
A feminist sensitivity to homophobia
is part of the ongoing attempt to free women’s studies from heterosexism. The assumption of heterosexuality both reflects
and reinforces ignorance about lesbian perspectives. Writers Adrienne Rich and Elly Bulkin, in particular, are making
feminist theory more truly inclusive from a lesbian perspective.
A term used by feminist historians
to describe the virtual exclusion of women, their lives, work and struggle from
research. Although women’s contribution
to history is now being recorded, women’s contribution to historical science is
still not acknowledged. See Lerner
(1978).
Feminist theories of identity have
moved on from neo-Freudian psychoanalysis and current poststructuralist
theory. Feminists argue that identity
is not the goal but rather the point of departure of any process of
self-consciousness. They suggest that
women’s understanding of identity is multiple and even self-contradictory. See Bulkin et al. (1984).
The contemporary debate about
identity politics was initiated by feminist psychoanalysts who described
sources of female identity other than penis envy. For example, Nancy Chodorow suggests that the first task of
individuation women undertake is the discovery of the ego boundaries between
ourselves and our mothers. See Chodorow
(1978). Feminists have gone on to argue
that a rejection of the mother, and hence of a true identity, is responsible
for the anti-feminism of some adult women.
See Flax (1980).
A feminist ideology is a body of
ideas which describes the sexism of any particular society and describes a
future society in which sexist contradictions would be eradicated. Sexist ideologies of domesticity are those
most attacked by feminist theorists since these ideas depict a static and
conservative image of women’s societal condition. By accounting for ways in which women’s social conditions evolved
historically and how male-defined social ideologies perpetuate women’s
inferiority, historians can recommend prescriptions for change. See Cott and Pleck (1979).
Marxist critics argue that the
economic function of a social institution, like the family, needs to interact
with an ideological function in order to produce a stable patriarchal
unit. The task of sexist ideology, they
argue, is to capture and preserve the institution across changes in economic
production. Ideology has, then, an
autonomy from economic formations. See
Barrett (1980). The task of feminism is
to expose the contradiction between the two.
Other definitions of ideology – for
example, Althusser’s concept of ideology as the way we live in the world – have
encouraged feminist theorists to explore psychoanalysis. Juliet Mitchell describes how this concept
of ideology helped her understand the family from within, and therefore understand its relative autonomy in the
ideological superstructure of society.
See Mitchell (1971).
A consistent theme in all feminist
writing about ideology is that the values and goals of women’s ideal social
condition must form the basis of any feminist ideology. Some feminists, however, are concerned about
the project of theorizing ideology
itself. Susan Griffin argues that no
matter what feminist ideology is constructed, it will always presume the idea
of the Other and hence the possibility of domination. See Griffin (1982b).
Usually the control of one state or country by another, or the economic
and ideological control of Black people by white. bell hooks argues that this condition applies internally in
America, which was colonized by white patriarchal men who institutionalized an
imperialistic social order in America not just in the Third World. See hooks (1981). Black feminists have identified ways in which a particular white
Eurocentric and Western view established itself in all theory, including that
of feminism. See Amos and Parmar
(1984).
The traditional organization of
ideas which is attacked by feminists in all disciplines. See Spender (1981). Feminist theory pays attention to women’s
different ideas especially the way in which feminist knowledge is
constructed through the interaction of
the self and the natural world. See
Stanley and Wise (1983). Within
feminism social knowledge and self-knowledge become mutually informing and
Marcia Westkott suggests that feminist knowledge begins with an awareness of
our relationship to the historical context in which we live. See Westkott (1983).
Socialist feminism characterizes
knowledge as a practical construct shaped by its social origins. Many feminists working in the sociology of
knowledge argue that disciplines are social phenomena with male-defined objectives
and male-defined environments. See
Bernard (1975). Other feminists argue
that the methods of sociology itself, its conceptual schemes and theories, are
built up within a male social universe.
See D. Smith (1974). Mary
Belenky’s Women’s Ways of Knowing
(1986) argues that women acquire knowledge through a different process than do
men and, thus, that the learning process demanded by academic institutions
place women at a major disadvantage.
Radical feminism argues that
knowledge does not grow in a linear way through the accumulation of facts and
the application of the hypothetico-deductive method but resembles ‘an upward
spiral’. Mary Daly uses the image of
spiraling to describe the growth of women’s knowledge and recommends that
feminists spin a new web of ideas like a spiral net. See Daly (1978). In this
way radical feminism has been able to create its own epistemological standards,
and argues that women have sources of special knowledge; for example, in Susan
Griffin’s concepts of nature. Radical
feminism sees the world as a structure of relations in process, a reality
constantly in evolution. See Hartsock
(1975).
Feminist theory takes language to be
an index of patriarchal attitudes, and the sexual distribution of social roles
and status. See McConnell-Ginet
(1980). The relationship between
language and cultural categories was an issue in the sociology of knowledge
before contemporary feminism. For
example, Basil Bernstein relates variations in language to class, status and
education codes. However, language, its
uses and powers, has been of foremost concern to feminists. As early as 1946 the feminist historian Mary
Beard declared that the ambiguity of the generic masculine was a fundamental
social problem. Dale Spender thinks
that the power of language is basic to patriarchy and Shirley Ardener argues
that ‘women’s speech’ exists because men have labelled it ‘women’s’. The debates about language characterize
contemporary debates in social and political theory: Sheila Rowbotham, for
example, argues that language is so much a part of political and ideological
power that its meanings need to be changed and cannot simply be annexed. See Rowbotham (1973b).
Feminist theory first analyses the
several forms taken by sexism in language.
These include the male generic, terms of address, and idioms. It aims to reinvent language. Barbara Du Bois suggests that poetic prose
can be one of the ways in which writers withdraw consent from a patriarchal
construction of reality (Du Bois 1983).
The problem is both one of concept formation within an existing
male-constructed framework of thought and one of creating a language which can
articulate an authentic understanding of the world. Radical feminism, understanding that language is a weapon which
diminishes the range of women’s thought, argues that the liberation of women is
rooted in the liberation of language.
Mary Daly in particular creates a feminist vocabulary (Daly 1978).
Toril Moi claims that this
Anglo-American criticism depoliticises theoretical paradigms. See Moi (1985). The issue of re-creation involves some feminists in rejecting the
language of theory altogether and others in investigating women’s body
language. See Henley (1977). Even if staying within a definition of
language which involves verbal communication, some feminists (for example,
Helene Cixous) argue for an essentially feminine mode which arises from women’s
sexual difference. Linguists – for
example, Robin Lakoff – define language difference as one of semantic usage in
women’s ‘genderlects’. All theories
agree, however, that some language is specifically, if not essentially,
characteristic of women and that feminist theory must move beyond the
examination of domination in language
to the emancipation of women through
language.
Abstract masculinity, according to Nancy Hartsock, is a mode of
conceptualization that emphasizes mutually exclusive dualities. She suggests that this accounts for
hierarchical dualisms in social institutions which underpin gender
domination. See Hartsock (1981). Masculinity is not constructed on the basis
of man’s real identity and difference
but on an ideal difference
constituted most essentially in the cultural differentiation of Man from his
Other. Nancy Chodorow describes these
aspects of masculinity in Western culture.
She offers a plausible psychoanalytic explanation for the male
characterization of woman as ‘Other’.
This occurs, Chodorow argues, because men learn to define themselves as
not woman, not the mother, so that masculinity is inevitably negative
identity. Chodorow claims that there
could be a conscious break in the construction of masculinity (and femininity)
if patterns of mothering changed. See
Chodorow (1978).
Marxist feminists argue that the
ideology of masculinity has played a crucial role in the division of labor as
it has developed historically, and that
definitions of masculinity (and femininity) that pervade our culture are
pre-eminently constructed within the ideology of the family. Barbara Ehrenreich and Deirdre English talk
of a transition from patriarchy to what they call ‘masculinism’. They characterize patriarchy as a pre-capitalist
social order organized around household production and ‘masculinism’ as the
industrial capitalist system itself.
Feminist theorists believe that these concepts can highlight the complex
importance of gender in differentiating public and private spheres of activity. See Interrante and Lasser (1979).
A particular focus of feminist
analysis is on the educational processes by which masculinity is defined and
constructed. See Deem (1978). For example, feminist critiques of science
point to the fallacious congruence between rationality, knowledge and
masculinity. Evelyn Fox Keller suggests
that masculine connotes autonomy, separation, distance and particularly
objectivity. Hence, she argues,
masculinity in science is located in the very concepts of science and also in
the way science separates subjects from objects. See Keller.
In addition, feminists have often
described utopias as matriarchies.
Charlotte Perkins Gilman, for example, incorporated powerful visions of
matriarchy into her fiction and essays.
Given the particular forms of
repression in Western culture which women experience, feminist psychoanalysis
has a special interest in investigating how memory structures concepts of the
self. It argues that memory preferences
are gendered. For example, Mary Jacobus
claims that women’s memory is a revision or representation of an ultimately
irretrievable past – our memories of our mothers (Jacobus 1987).
Feminist historians read the
memories recorded in women’s diaries in order to reclaim the personal and
communal histories of women. See
Smith-Rosenberg, 1985. Because much of
Black history comes through an oral tradition, memory plays a pivotal role in
Black culture enabling Black women to be both subjects and sources in their own worlds.
The memories of rural Black women are changing scholarship. See Darling (1987).
Many women artists are constructing
an aesthetic of memory. The writer
Maxine Hong Kingston describes ‘reverse memory’ which is a memory of the future
not the past and the artist Mary Kelly made her Post Partum Document an archaeology of memories of family life.
A feminist politics of memory would
prevent women denying aspects of female experience and would be, what Adrienne
Rich calls, a feminist Re-vision.
The theory which explains the
discordance between what men expect women’s behavior to be and what women
actually do is called the theory of muted groups. According to Shirley and Edwin Ardener every society has a
dominant ideology which describes all social behavior. That dominant ideology shapes thinking about
social norms and expectations, supplies the vocabulary used by, and reflects
the image of reality held by, the dominant group. Suppressed subgroups who have different views may lack the
language to express their views or conceptualize their differences. According to the theory of muted groups the
dominant male perception may provide a model of the world whose existence and
pervasiveness impede the creation of alternative models. See Ardener (1981).
Women who are trained in academic
disciplines whose theoretical models correspond to a male perception of reality
may also find it difficult to discover a conceptual framework and vocabulary
which expresses our own perception of reality.
See Smith (1974).
Sexual objectification is the primary form of the subjection of women,
Catherine MacKinnin argues. It is the
male epistemological stance. There is
no distinction, for women, between objectification and alienation. See MacKinnon (1982).
The objectification of women in art
and literature goes along with our objectification in pornography, claim
feminist critics, since pornography is merely a simplified version of general
objectification. Within culture, women
are a generic object whose subject is the male gender. Culture is itself predicted upon the aestheticisation
and objectification of women. See
Kappeler (1986).
Women have a double objectification
in pornography where we are the objects of men’s action in scenarios and the
object of representation with no correspondence to, or reference to, any real
objects. MacKinnon argues that this
process is hard to refute empirically because it acts as a barrier to
consciousness. When women experience objectification we can evolve
feminist methods which in turn can overthrow the distinction between subjectivity
and objectivity. MacKinnon thinks that
sexual objectification has its own periods, forms and technology but that it
might, potentially, have its own revolutions.
The apparently value-free or neutral
detachment of a researcher from a subject.
It is normally polarized to subjectivity. It is a contentious concept of feminist research. Many feminists argue that objectivity is the
method of traditional disciplines because they all deny the personal experience
and emotions of women. The quest for
objectivity and the tendency towards isolation are now part of a masculine
professionalisation because the rhetoric of objectivity has influenced concepts
of professionalisation and academic style.
See Furner (1975). Others argue
that since no research can be objective, feminists can use the appearance of objectivity as a powerful
tool for changing public opinion. For
example, a good research method can be objective while the researcher can still
subjectively identify with her topic.
See Jayaratne (1983).
The most thoroughgoing critique of
objectivity has been made by feminist critics of science. They argue the need for objectivity, which
is the need to dominate, has shaped the form of scientific research and is part
of scientific culture. The association
of science with objectivity, Evelyn Fox Keller argues, is based on its
association with maleness. She defines
the separation of subject and object and the objectification of nature as a
masculine mode because part of the ways boys acquire their gender identity is
by objectifying their mothers. Keller
attacks the arguments which assert an eternal opposition between (male)
objectivity and (female) subjectivity as being nihilistic. She claims that if the mythological
connection between (male) gender and science is dissolved, this will benefit
both the practice of science and social attitudes toward maleness and
femaleness. See Keller (1982). Chodrow, Dinnerstein and Keller echo males
writers of the 1960’s like Marcuse who similarly questioned the apotheosis of
scientific objectivity, but what their feminist perspectives contribute is the
realization that objectivity is linked to patriarchy not just to capitalism.
A description of the nature of
existence. A feminist ontology has at its
core a conception of a self-other relation
that is significantly different from the self-other opposition in traditional
Western thought. A feminist ontology is
a society organized around the practice of mutual realization whose paradigms
come from mother-child relations and the practice of mothering and family
living.
Radical feminism – for example, in
the writing of Adrienne Rich, Sara Ruddick and Carol Gilligan – claims that
ontology and epistemology imply each other.
A radical feminist ontology is one where everything is connected to
everything else. See Whitbeck
(1983). Nancy Hartsock claims that
women’s relationally defined existence, experience of boundary challenges and
activity of transforming both physical objects and human beings would result in
a world-view in which dichotomies would be foreign. See Hartsock (1981).
It is the standpoint of women which
generates an ontology of relations and of continual process.
Women’s oppression is the experience
of sexism as a system of domination.
Christine Delphy makes the point that the use of the term oppression is
crucial to feminist theory because it places feminist struggle in a radical
political framework. See Delphy (1980).
Contemporary feminists are united in
opposition to women’s oppression, but differ not only in their views of how to
combat that oppression, but also in their ideas of what constitutes women’s
oppression in contemporary society.
Liberal feminists believe that women are oppressed because we suffer
discrimination; Marxists believe that women are oppressed in production, while
socialist feminists characterize women’s oppression in the home as similar to
the oppressive experience of wage labor.
Distinctions between the so-called public and private spheres obscure
the fact that the subordination of women is part of the foundation of
society. The apparent universality of
women’s oppression has encouraged radical feminism to conclude that this is the primary or fundamental form of
domination. As Ti-Grace Atkinson
pointed out, the oppression of women has not changed significantly over time or
place. Susan Griffin, Andrea Dworkin,
Susan Brownmiller, Robin Morgan and Shulamith Firestone all agree that women’s
oppression is primarily due to a universal male control of women’s bodies and
sexuality. Firestone’s distinctive,
biologically based theory, influenced by Marxism, attempts to provide an
account of women’s oppression that is both historical and materialist. Firestone argues that biological imperatives
are overlaid by social institutions.
For example, sexual and child rearing practices reinforce male dominance
(Firestone, 1970).
Radical feminism argues that since
only patriarchy defines women by their sexuality, women’s oppression must be
located in the institutional practices of sexuality. For example, motherhood and rape reinforce the innate and
unchanging oppression of women by men.
See Koedt (1973). In other
words, where idealist definitions of women’s oppression involved the idea that
patriarchy was an ideology negotiated through interactions, feminists now think
women’s oppression is derived from phallocentrism. See Stanley and Wise (1983).
Adrienne Rich argues that when women
both take oppression as an object of understanding (that is, reflect on its
history), and feel oppression in a deeply personal way, we can assert ourselves
against it. See Rich (1976).
A crucial concept developed by Simone de Beauvoir in The Second Sex (1953) to explain how, in
patriarchal culture, woman is set up as the negative, the inessential, the
abnormal to the male. Women are Other
because they are defined by men as inferior.
De Beauvoir adopted a notion from Sartre about the basic conflictual
nature of human relations, arguing that woman as Other was a metaphysical idea,
a myth on which men had built society.
The concept is pervasive, de Beauvoir reveals, because woman accepts her
Otherness, her inferiority. In her
later writings de Beauvoir expressed second thoughts about her formulation of
this theme but not about her articulation of feminism in terms of
existentialism.
In French theory the concept has two
meanings: ‘Other’ as in relation to a speaking subject and ‘Otherness’ as outside the conceptual system. Lacan, for example, describes the
unconscious of the subject as the discourse of the Other. By being a conscious ‘Other’, woman affirms
man in his manhood. See Lacan (1966). The feminist critics, Helene Cixous and Luce
Irigaray, argue that Otherness, if defined as the feminine, opens up new
possibilities for women because by celebrating
difference women achieve immanence.
A system of male authority which
oppresses women through its social, political and economic institutions. In any of the historical forms that
patriarchal society takes, whether it is feudal, capitalist or socialist, a
sex-gender system and a system of economic discrimination operate
simultaneously. Patriarchy has power
from men’s greater access to, and mediation of, the resources and rewards of
authority structures inside and outside the home.
The concept ‘patriarchy’ is crucial
to contemporary feminism because feminism needed a term by which the totality
of oppressive and exploitative relations which affect women could be
expressed. Over and above this
particular characterization, each feminist theory finds that a different
feature of patriarchy defines women’s subordination. The two ends of the feminist continuum might be represented on
the one hand by Gayle Rubin who argues that if we use the term sex-gender
system patriarchy would be only one form, a male dominant one, of a sex-gender
system. See Rubin (1975). The other approach is that of Kate Millett
or Shulamith Firestone. Millett argues
that patriarchy is analytically independent of capitalist or other modes of
production and Firestone defines patriarchy in terms of male control of women’s
reproduction.
Socialist or Marxist feminists
prefer to locate patriarchy in a materialist context. They argue that the capitalist mode of production is structured
by a patriarchal sexual division of labor.
Capitalist class relations and the sexual division of labor are mutually
self-enforcing. For example, Heidi Hartmann
defines patriarchy as a set of social relations with a material base operating
on a system of male hierarchical relations and male solidarity. She denies that patriarchy is universal and
unchanging and claims that its intensity changes over time. See Hartmann (1976). Zillah Eisenstein suggests that an erosion
in patriarchy begins to occur with structural changes in the market place and
changes in wage structures. Such
conflicts between capitalism and patriarchy, she claims, will undermine
liberalism and the Welfare State. See
Eisenstein (1982). Still within this
materialist perspective, Ann Ferguson argues, more positively, that the
weakening of the patriarchal family during capitalism created the material
conditions for the growth of lesbianism.
See Ferguson et al.
(1982). Ferguson builds on the economic
theories of Mirra Komarovsky who describes the distinction in economic theory
between masculine privilege (sanctioned advantage) and patriarchal authority
(sanctioned domination) in different segments of the class structure. See Komarovsky (1964).
Radical feminism, on the other hand,
equates patriarchy with male domination.
It is a system of social relations in which the class ‘men’ have power
over the class ‘women’ because women are sexually devalued. Radical feminism is sometimes attacked as
being ahistorical because it argues that patriarchy cannot be periodised like
the Marxist modes of production. For
example, Mary Daly argues that patriarchy is itself the prevailing religion of
the entire planet. Radical feminism
relies on feminist psychoanalysis to provide explanations for this construction
of patriarchy. The psychoanalyst
Dorothy Dinnerstein claims that patriarchy, or women’s exclusion from history,
stems from the gender formation of males and females and the double standard
that this entails.
A term in feminist theory used to
describe the way society regards the phallus or penis as a symbol of power, and
believes that attributes of masculinity are the norm for cultural
definitions. The phallocentric fallacy
in disciplines is the assumption that ‘person’ stands for male and therefore
that women’s experience has made no contribution to disciplinary methods or
content. This perspective (sometimes
known as androcentric) makes women unknowable.
See Du Bois (1983). Feminists
argue that phallocentrism is a source of women’s oppression in education. See Stanley and Wise (1983). Feminist literary critics also draw
attention to how phallocentrism in literature establishes the idea that
artistic creativity is a masculine quality.
See Gilbert and Gubar (1979).
A concept devised by Jacques Derrida
to describe the meeting of phallocentrism with logocentrism. Phallogocentrism is how patriarchy models
its thought and language. Because phallogocentrism
is the name of the everyday discursive world, French feminists are determined
to replace this ideology with an alternative women’s language, or ecriture feminine. The writings of Helene Cixous and Luce
Irigaray, in particular, contain new forms of expression using attributes of
female sexuality (of jouissance and
multiple pleasure) to replace phallocentric (male) pleasure which is singular
(the phallus). See Cixous (1981) and
Irigaray (1977b).
The term dates from the late 1950s
although the break up of colonial empires began immediately after the Second
World War. The prefix ‘post’ suggests
that ‘postcolonialism’ describes cultures after
independence but a postcolonial can be both a migrant ‘ethnic minority’ as well
as a national citizen, and postcolonial often describes any culture shaped by
imperialism. For these reasons
postcolonial theory focuses on several issues: identity in relation to
nationalisms and imperialism; the role of the state; and conflicts between
traditional and contemporary cultures.
Beginning with Franz Fanon’s The
Wretched of the Earth and continuing in Edward Said’s Orientalism, through to the feminist theories of Gayatri Spivak,
Rey Chow and others, the central attack is on Western ethnocentrism. Other key features of postcolonial theory
are: a hybrid mixture of histories, languages and issues, both indigenous and
Western; a questioning of European discourse – its universalism and its genres;
and a struggle between place and displacement and language.
There are strong connections between
postcolonial and feminist theory in the way that both wish to give a voice to
historically marginalised people; see, for example, the work of Alice Walker
(Walker 1983). Those theorists making a
particular study of ‘Otherness’ in imperial and postcolonial writing are called
colonial discourse critics. They claim
that literary and cultural representations relate to material aggressions where
the violence of literary stereotypes matches economic exploitations (Minh-ha
1989, Mohanty 1985). Rey Chow argues
that Western theory denies Eastern writing a complexity, a subjectivity and its
own cross-cultural appropriation of the West (Chow 1990).
Gayatri Spivak is a leading
postcolonial critic who wishes to give the subaltern a voice in history rather than to speak for Third World women (Spivak
1987). Subaltern studies involves the
analysis of South Asian history and culture by a group under the editorship of
Ranajit Guha. Subalternity, Spivak
argues, is a major allegory of the displacement of the gendered, colonized subaltern subject by imperialism and
materialism. In her accounts of this
double burden of colonized women, Spivak focuses on practices of ‘comprador’ or
imperialist languages, showing how Western figures of speech often obliterate
the viewpoints of Others. In
opposition, postcolonial criticism describes the specific formations of
collective ‘identities-in-resistance’.
Representation Feminism, alongside semiology and Marxism, has made a complex appraisal of representation, or the construction of images. The term ‘representa